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SUPERIORITY IN VALUE AND THE 
REPUGNANT CONCLUSION∗
Karsten Klint Jensen 
Danish Centre for Bioethics and Risk Assessment 
kkj@foi.dk
 
ABSTRACT: James Griffin has considered a weak form of superiority in 
value a possible remedy to the Repugnant Conclusion. In this paper, I 
demonstrate that, in a context where value is additive, this weaker form 
collapses into a stronger form of superiority. And in a context where value 
is non-additive, weak superiority does not amount to a radical value 
difference at all. I then spell out the consequences of these results for 
different interpretations of Griffin’s suggestion regarding population ethics. 
None of them comes out very successful, but perhaps they nevertheless 
retain some interest. 
 
                                                     
 
∗ I should like to thank Gustaf Arrhenius, John Broome, Roger Crisp, James 
Griffin, Nils Holtug and Wlodek Rabinowicz for helpful discussion on this subject, 
which I have worked with on and off for many years. This paper was presented at 
the John Stuart Mill Bicentennial Conference in April 2006, London. I am indebted 
to Statens Räddningsverk for financial support. 
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It is a great pleasure to honour Wlodek. He is among the philosophers who 
have been most important for me. He is not only a brilliant philosopher. He 
also has the quality – rare among philosophers I am sorry to say – of being 
a very nice and generous person. To the benefit of us all, this characteristic 
transpires extremely fruitfully in the way he works with and discusses 
philosophy. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
John Stuart Mill famously introduced the notion of superiority of quality of 
a pleasure, claiming that1
 
[i]f one of the two [pleasures] is, by those who are competently acquainted with 
both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to 
be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign it for any 
quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified 
in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far 
outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account. 
 
In recent decades, such superiority relations between different objects of 
value have been the subject of interest, probably because James Griffin, 
 
1 J. S. Mill: Utiltarianism (1861), quoted from Utilitarianism, On Liberty, 
Considerations on Representative Government, London: Dent, 1993, p. 9. 
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Derek Parfit and others have considered them a possible remedy to the 
Repugnant Conclusion in population ethics. 
 
Parfit states different versions of the Repugnant Conclusion,2 but what they 
seem to have in common is this: Suppose we have a scale of welfare. 
Consider some number of people n all living on a very high level a. For any 
positive level of welfare, z, however low, a population of m people at z is 
better than n people at a, provided m is large enough. Parfit and many 
others consider this conclusion repugnant. It follows straightforwardly from 
the Utilitarian Total Principle (if mz>na and hence if m>na/z). But 
according to Parfit, it follows from any reasonable principle of beneficence, 
provided that mere addition of people at a positive level of welfare does not 
make an outcome worse and that the principle ‘if y is not worse than x and 
z is better then y, then z is better than x’ holds for betterness.3
 
In a note, Griffin writes:4
 
[...] That our reasoning carries us to New Z is The Repugnant Conclusion.  
 
2 D. Parfit: Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, pp. 338, 419-
441. 
3 A "reasonable” principle of distribution, in this context, is a principle which 
implies that if one of two outcomes with the same people has a greater total of 
welfare and it has welfare more equally distributed, then it is better. 
4 J. Griffin: Well-Being. Its meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1986, p. 340 (note 27). 
  
4 
But does it? [...] there is another possibility confined entirely to the reasoning 
about beneficence. Parfit’s argument seems implicitly to employ a totting-up 
conception of measuring well-being; it treats well-being as measurable on a 
single continuous additive scale, where low numbers, if added to themselves 
often enough, must become larger than any initial, larger number. But this 
seems not true in prudential cases, and it would seem likely that this 
incommensurability in prudential values would get transferred to interpersonal 
calculation. Perhaps it is better to have a certain number of people at a certain 
high level than a very much larger number at a level where life is just worth 
living. Then we might wish to stop the slide [...] at that point along the line 
where people’s capacity to appreciate beauty, to form deep loving relationships, 
to accomplish something with their lives beyond just staying alive ... all 
disappear. 
 
Griffin points to an implicit assumption as to the measurement of welfare. 
He claims that Parfit’s arguments to the effect that we cannot avoid the 
Repugnant Conclusion implicitly assume welfare to be measurable on a 
continuous additive scale satisfying what is known as the Archimedean 
property of real numbers: for any positive number x, no matter how small, 
and for any number y, no matter how large, there exists an integer n, such 
that nx≥y. This simply means that any two (positive) levels of welfare are 
commensurable, i.e. their ratio is not infinite. 
 
But reflection on the measurement of welfare suggests that this assumption 
is not fulfilled. Presumably, then, a certain low level z could be infinitely 
small compared with other, higher levels, for instance a. And it would seem 
to follow that this level could never add up to the high level, that is, the 
total na would necessarily be greater than the total mz, no matter how large 
  
5 
                                                     
m is. Therefore, the Utilitarian Total Principle does not imply the 
Repugnant Conclusion. At least this is how I shall understand Griffin’s 
suggestion. 
 
Somewhat strangely, no one appears to have taken this suggestion 
seriously. Roger Crisp is an exception.5 He explicitly draws out the 
consequence that some form of discontinuity will block that the Repugnant 
Conclusion follows from Total Utilitarianism. However, he also identifies 
this position as a version of Parfit’s Lexical View.6 This seems to me a 
confusion of two clearly distinct positions. As I understand the Lexical 
View, there is a standard (Archimedean) scale of welfare; but on this scale 
we then determine two levels, such that lives above the higher level are 
assigned a weight which lexically dominates the weight of lives below the 
lower level.  
 
The trouble with this view is that it requires some justification to claim that 
some persons’ welfare should weigh differently than others’. It can hardly 
be said to be a concern for beneficence to assign less weight to low levels. 
And the weights have nothing to do with considerations of equality: In the 
outcomes in question, there is complete equality. It is precisely because it 
avoids this problem that Griffin’s suggestion deserves attention.  
 
 
5 R. Crisp: Ideal Utilitarianism: Theory and Practice. DPhil. Thesis, Oxford 
University, 1988, pp. 177-78. 
6 Parfit, op.cit., p. 188. 
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Griffin introduces two superiority relations that could account for welfare 
not being measurable on a scale fulfilling the Archimedean property. One is 
trumping: “any amount of A outranks any amount of B” and the other is the 
weaker discontinuity: “enough of A outranks any amount of B”.7 He 
considers the latter more plausible and therefore his argument is based on 
discontinuity. 
 
In this paper, I shall present some general results on the properties of this 
value superiority relation between objects. As we shall see, it behaves very 
differently, depending on whether value is additive or not. In an additive 
context, discontinuity collapses into trumping. And in a non-additive 
context, discontinuity – perhaps counter intuitively – does not imply a 
radical value difference at all. I then spell out the consequences of these 
results for different interpretations of Griffin’s suggestion regarding 
population ethics.  
 
 
2. Superiority in Value when Value is Additive 
 
This section and the next build on a seminal paper by Arrhenius & 
Rabinowicz.8 I shall merely draw out some consequences, which are more 
or less implicit in their work. The framework is this: Suppose there is a 
 
7 Griffin, op.cit., pp. 83-86. 
8 G. Arrhenius & W. Rabinowicz: “Millian Superiorities”, Utilitas 17 (2005): 127-
146. 
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countable set of objects. I assume that there is a concatenation procedure 
by which it is possible to form a new object by conjoining a finite number 
of separate objects into one whole. This includes the possibility of 
conjoining an object e a finite number of times m with an object exactly 
like itself; such an object is designated by ‘me’. The domain is closed under 
concatenation.9
 
On the domain of objects, there is a weak betterness relation, – is at least as 
good as –. Strict betterness and equivalence relations are defined in the 
usual way.10 This weak betterness relation is assumed to be transitive11 and 
complete12. It is further assumed that concatenation is value-increasing, i.e. 
for all objects e and e’, the whole consisting of e and e’ is better than e. In 
particular, ‘self-concatenation’ is value-increasing, i.e. for all objects e and 
all m>1, me is better than (m-1)e.  
 
 
9 It is assumed that concatenation is associative, which means that we get the same 
whole from concatenating any three objects, regardless of the order in which they 
are concatenated 
10 That is: e is better than e’, if and only if e is at least as good as e’, and e’ is not as 
least as good as e; and e is equivalent to e’ if and only if e is at least as good as e’, 
and e’ is at least as good as e. 
11 That is: for all objects e, e’, e’’: if e is at least as good as e’, and e’ is at least as 
good as e’’, then e is at least as good as e’’. 
12 That is: for all objects e, e’; either e is at least as good as e’ or e’ is at least as 
good as e. 
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Now, we can define the relevant superiority relations corresponding to 
Griffin’s trumping and discontinuity (I shall use Arrhenius’ and 
Rabinowicz’ terminology from now on): 
 
DEFINITION 1: An object e is superior to an object e’ if and only if, for 
all positive integers n, e is better than ne’. 
 
DEFINITION 2: An object e is weakly superior to an object e’ if and only 
if, for some positive integer m and all positive integers n, me is better than 
ne’. 
 
First, I shall assume that value is additive with respect to concatenation, i.e. 
the value of a concatenated whole is the sum of the value of each of its 
constituents. For this, the following condition is the principal necessary 
condition:13
 
INDEPENDENCE: An object e is at least as good as e’, if and only if e 
concatenated with any object is at least as good as e’ concatenated with that 
object.14
 
 
13 Cf. D. H. Krantz., D. R. Luce, P. Suppes and A. Tversky: Foundations of 
Measurement. Vol. 1: Additive and Polynomial Representations. San Diego: 
Academic Press, 1971, pp. 73-74. 
14 Arrhenius & Rabinowicz only assume the ‘only if’-part in their Independence-
condition – that is all they need for their Observation 2. 
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Hence, replacing e’ by e in any whole results in a whole that is at least as 
good.  
 
Consider the Archimedean Condition that for all e, e’ there exists a positive 
integer n such that ne’ is at least as good as e. This condition is called 
Archimedean because it corresponds to the Archimedean property of real 
numbers. Since the Archimedean property is true of the real numbers, the 
Archimedean Condition is necessary for measurement in real numbers. If 
the Archimedean condition holds and the domain is sufficiently rich to 
ensure the solvability condition that if e is better than e’, then there exists 
some e’’ such that e is equivalent to the whole consisting of e’ and e’’, then 
the betterness relation could be represented by a real-valued function which 
is additive with respect to concatenation.15
 
Suppose that e is superior to e’ and Independence holds. Superiority 
violates the Archimedean Condition – superiority is precisely defined as the 
condition that there is no number such that ne’ is at least as good as e. 
Consequently, the value ratio between e and e’ is infinite and cannot be 
measured by any real number.16
 
Consider next weak superiority. In his discussion of measurement of well-
being, Griffin (1986, p. 85) says about weak superiority (which he calls 
'discontinuity’) that it brings with it  
 
15 Krantz et al., ibid. 
16 Cf. Krantz et al., op.cit., pp. 271-272. 
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the suspension of addition; [...] we have a positive value that, no matter how 
often a certain amount is added to itself, cannot become greater than another 
positive value, and cannot, not because with piling up we get diminishing value 
or even disvalue (though there are such cases), but because [it is] the sort of 
value, that, even when remaining constant, cannot add up to some other value. 
 
It is not part of the definition of weak superiority that value is additive. 
However, Griffin seems here to assume that it is. Weak superiority likewise 
violates the Archimedean Condition. However, weak superiority is further 
assumed to imply that the inferior value can add up to some amount of the 
weakly superior value. It is only when the amount of the weakly superior 
value is sufficiently large (“enough”) that the inferior value can never add 
up to this amount – addition is then “suspended”. 
 
I shall demonstrate that this picture cannot be upheld. If e’ cannot add up to 
me, it cannot even add up to e. In other words, if we assume Independence, 
then weak superiority collapses into superiority: 
 
OBSERVATION 1: Independence implies that if some element e is weakly 
superior to another e’, then e is also superior to e’. 
 
PROOF: Assume, for reductio, that some element e is weakly superior to 
another element e’, but not superior to it. The fact that e is weakly superior 
to e’ means that there is some m, such that me is better than any number of 
e’-elements.The fact that e is not superior to e’ means that there is some q, 
such that e is not better than qe’. Assume, for all n=2, 3, …, that (n-1)e is 
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not better than (n-1)qe’. Independence then implies that ne is not better than 
(n-1)qe’ concatenated with e. Since e is not better than qe, Independence 
implies that (n-1)qe’ concatenated with e is not better than nqe’. By 
mathematical induction, it then follows that ne is not better than nqe’. But 
then it cannot be the case that that there is some m, such that me is better 
than any number of e’-elements. 
 
Arrhenius and Rabinowicz prove that, if in a decreasing sequence e1, …, en 
the first element is superior to the last one, then Independence implies that 
some element in the sequence is superior to its immediate successor.17 So 
in this case we cannot come from the superior object to the inferior object 
through a number of steps where each object in the sequence is only 
marginally worse than its immediate predecessor. At least one step is itself 
a step to something drastically worse – as a matter of fact, we know from 
above that it is a step to something infinitely worse, since the difference 
cannot be measured by any real number. 
 
 
3. Superiority in Value when Value is Non-Additive  
 
However, suppose we give up additivity, i.e. give up Independence. For 
this case, Arrhenius and Rabinowicz prove: for any two objects e and e’, 
where e is weakly superior to e’ without being superior to it, the domain 
must contain a finite decreasing sequence of objects in which the first 
 
17 Arrhenius & Rabinowicz, op.cit., Observation 2. 
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element is superior to the last one, but no element is superior to its 
immediate successor.18  
 
We know from OBSERVATION 1 that the requirement that weak 
superiority does not collapse into superiority is inconsistent with 
Independence. And as Arrhenius and Rabinowicz note, if Independence is 
denied, then it becomes possible that by concatenating some object e’ to 
itself any number of times, the marginal value of each contribution, though 
always positive, converges to zero, such that there is a finite upper limit to 
the aggregated value. I should like to demonstrate that this will necessarily 
be the case. 
 
Remember that we are dealing with a transitive and complete weak 
betterness relation defined on a countable set of objects on which a 
concatenation operation is defined, such that the domain is closed under 
concatenation. Since the domain is a countable set, the betterness relation 
can be represented ordinally by a real-valued function V, such that  
 
e is as least as good as e’ if and only if V(e)≥V(e’).19
 
Now the following can be proved: 
 
 
18 Arrhenius & Rabinowicz, op.cit., Observation 1. 
19 Cf. Krantz et al., op.cit., p. 39 (Theorem 2.1). 
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OBSERVATION 2: Suppose it is the case that some object e is weakly 
superior to another e’ without being superior to it. Then the sequence V(e’), 
V(2e’), V(3e’), … has an upper bound. 
 
PROOF: Since e is weakly superior to e’, there is some m, such that V(me) 
is greater than V(ne’), no matter how big n is. It follows immediately that 
the sequence V(e’), V(2e’), V(3e’), … has V(me) as upper bound. 
 
Hence, weak superiority is not a sign of a large difference between the 
superior and the inferior object, but rather dependent on how the value of 
self-concatenation of the inferior object develops. We also know20 that if 
some object e in a decreasing sequence is weakly superior to another e’ 
without being superior to it, then the domain also contains some object that 
is superior to e’. In fact, any object with a value above the upper bound of 
the V(e’), V(2e’), V(3e’), … will be superior to e’. Thus, under these 
circumstances, not even superiority is a sign of a radical difference. 
 
It could even be the case that some object e is superior to e’, but not to 
some object e’’, which is worse than e’, because the aggregated value of 
self-concatenation of e’’ has a higher upper bound than that of e’ or even 
no upper bound and hence an aggregated value that could exceed the value 
of e. Note also that if self-concatenation of e’’ has a higher upper bound 
than that of e’, then we have a case where e’’ is weakly superior to e’ even 
though e’’ is worse than e’. 
 
20 From Arrhenius & Rabinowicz, op.cit., Observation 1. 
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Arrhenius and Rabinowicz also prove that if in a finite sequence of objects 
the first element is weakly superior to the last element, then there exists at 
least one element that is weakly superior to its immediate successor.21 
Given my observations above, there is a simple and informative proof of 
this observation: 
 
PROOF: Suppose Independence is fulfilled. Because of my 
OBSERVATION 1, weak superiority collapses into superiority and we 
know22 that in a decreasing sequence where the first element is superior 
(and therefore also weakly superior) to the last element, then some element 
in sequence is superior (and therefore also weakly superior) to it immediate 
successor. And if Independence is not fulfilled, we know from my 
OBSERVATION 2 that the last element, concatenated by an element like 
itself any number of times, has an upper bound. The preceding element, 
concatenated any number of times by an element like itself, either has an 
upper bound which is higher than this or has no upper bound, in which case 
it is weakly superior to the last element (because there will be some number 
of this element which is better than any number of the last) and the proof is 
done, or it has an upper bound that is lower or equal to the bound of the last 
element, in which case it is not weakly superior to it (indeed, if the upper 
bound is lower the last element would be weakly superior to the preceding 
one). In the latter case, we can repeat the procedure until we are either done 
 
21 Arrhenius & Rabinowicz, op.cit., Observation 3. 
22 From Arrhenius & Rabinowicz, op.cit., Observation 2 
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or finally reach the next-to-the-first element, which in that case must have 
en upper bound that is lower or equal to the bound of the last element; but 
since the first element by hypothesis is weakly superior to the last one, it is 
also weakly superior to this one. 
 
Arrhenius and Rabinowicz are somewhat surprised by their result, because 
they start out with the intuition that both superiority and weak superiority 
are drastic differences in value. Whereas Rabinowicz is willing to accept 
that an element can be weakly superior to another even though it is only 
marginally better, Arrhenius23 sticks to the intuition and takes the line that 
Rabinowicz’ and his results provide an argument against superiority and 
weak superiority in all contexts where it is possible to construct a sequence 
of objects in which the value differences between adjacent objects are 
marginal.  
 
But as my results show, weak superiority does not depend on the difference 
between elements, but solely on how the aggregated value of self-
concatenation develops. Hence, even in a decreasing finite sequence in 
which each consecutive element is only marginally worse than the 
immediately preceding one, weak superiority can obtain; and even an 
element which is worse than another might be weakly superior to it. For the 
same reason, weak superiority between the extrema of a finite sequence 
does not mean that the last element is radically worse than the point of 
 
23 See here also G. Arrhenius: ”Superiority in Value”, Philosophical Studies 123 
(2005): 97-114. 
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departure. Moreover, if we have a finite decreasing sequence of objects in 
which the first element is superior to the last one, and some element in the 
sequence is weakly superior to another one, then not even superiority is a 
radical difference in value. 
 
Arrhenius further claims that superiority and weak superiority share some 
problems when we consider outcomes that involve both superior and 
inferior objects.24 Consider three objects e, e’ and e’’, where e is only 
marginally better than e’, and e’ is clearly better than e’’. Assume further 
that e is superior or weakly superior to e’ (and in the latter case, let n be a 
number such that ne is better than any number e’). Compare a whole, a, 
consisting of ne, with another whole, b, consisting of ne and me’’, where m 
is much greater than n. By the assumption of value increasingness, b is 
better than a. Consider now a third whole, c, consisting of (n+m)e’. Since e 
(or ne) is superior to e’, a is better than c. However, Arrhenius says, 
compare b and c: since the loss of getting e’ instead of e is only marginal, 
and the gain from getting e’ instead of e’’ is bigger, there should be some 
sufficiently large m, such that c is better than b; and then, by transitivity, we 
would have that c is better than a. Hence, the notions of superiority and 
weak superiority seem to imply a contradiction in this case. 
 
But, taken on its face value, Arrhenius’ reasoning is mistaken. If e is 
superior (or weakly superior) to e’, then the loss of e (or the loss of having 
less than ne) cannot be compensated by any number of e’. Therefore, b is 
 
24 Arrhenius, op.cit., pp. 108-109. 
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better than c, and there is no contradiction. When he says that there is 
marginal loss for each e-object that has been exchanged for an e’-object, 
but a bigger gain for each e’’-object that has been exchanged for an e’-
object, he appears to assume Independence. But if Independence is 
fulfilled, and e is superior to e’, the value difference between e and e’ 
cannot be marginal, which it is by hypothesis in the example.  
 
However, Arrhenius might still have a point. When he says that it is hard to 
deny that there is some m such that the smaller number of smaller losses is 
compensated for by the greater number of greater gains, he could be 
understood as implying that, given the marginal difference between e and 
e’, it is implausible that the loss of ne (or even e) cannot be compensated by 
a sufficiently large number m e’-objects; otherwise, the marginal value of 
adding extra e’-objects would – implausibly – diminish extremely rapidly. 
This may be true, in which case c would be better than b (which is better 
than a); but if it is, e cannot be superior or weakly superior to e’, and so a 
cannot at the same time be better than c. Thus, even though there is no 
contradiction, this reasoning could support his initial claim that superiority 
relations are implausible in these contexts. 
 
 
4. Weak Superiority and the Repugnant Conclusion: The Case of 
Infinite Standard Sequences on the Inferior Values 
 
Griffin’s main idea is that no amount of certain less important values can 
ever compensate a substantial loss of certain more important and genuine 
values. The underlying picture here is that welfare depends on the degree to 
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which a number of prudential values are realised.25 More precisely, I shall 
assume that welfare is measured by the sum of the value contribution from 
each value. And if one of the important values is realised to a sufficient 
degree, its value contribution is such that the contribution from an 
unimportant value never can add up to it, no matter how much it is realised. 
 
Griffin gives an example, where an unimportant value is a sort of residual 
value to an important one, such that when the latter is lost, we might get the 
former:26 The important value is “appreciation of beauty”. If we gradually 
reduce the degree to which this value is realised, we shall eventually reach 
a point, where it is lost. We might instead have “kicks of kitsch” but they 
are different, that is, they represent a different value, which still gives a 
positive contribution but one that is inferior to the contribution from 
genuine appreciation of beauty. 
 
Griffin’s suggestion is based on the idea that weak superiority between 
valuable objects is a more plausible condition than superiority. But since 
his suggestion also implies a context where value is additive, we should 
expect from OBSERVATION 1 that weak superiority collapses into 
superiority. However, to be able to apply OBSERVATION 1 on this 
context, I need to set up a slightly more complicated apparatus.  
 
 
25 Cf. the list in Griffin, op cit., p. 67. 
26 Griffin, op.cit., pp.86-87. 
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I assume a list of prudential values A, B, C, … . In a given life, each of 
these values is realised to a certain degree which I shall assume can be 
measured by a non-negative number. Thus, there is a domain of possible 
lives, L={l1, l2, l3, …}, where each life is represented by a vector (a, b, c, 
…) and a, b, c, … are non-negative numbers describing the degree to which 
each of the values A, B, C, … is realised in this life. 
 
Like before, there is a weak betterness relation, – is at least as good as –, 
defined on this domain, which is assumed to be transitive and complete. 
This relation embodies global preferences over the domain of possible 
lives, which Griffin considers basic for the measurement of welfare.  
 
Some values might really be disvalues, giving a negative contribution to 
overall welfare. In this context, I shall only consider values giving positive 
or zero contribution to overall welfare. However, I shall allow for the fact 
that the marginal contribution from each positive value diminishes the more 
it is realised. 
 
Next, I shall assume some necessary conditions for value contributions to 
be additive, such that the welfare of a life, w(l) where l=(a, b, c, …) could 
be measured by the sum of contributions wA(a)+wB(b)+wB
                                                     
C(c)+… from each 
of the values. Here, I draw on what is known as additive conjoint 
measurement.  Additive conjoint measurement does not rely on a simple 
concatenation procedure like the one outlined above, with respect to which 
27
 
27 Cf. Krantz et al., op.cit., Chapter 6. 
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it is additive. In order to establish additivity, it simulates concatenation in a 
more complicated way.  The first necessary condition is a form of 
independence known as strong separability:  
28
 
DEFINITION 3: Consider some subset of values, say P and Q, and let the 
degree of realisation of each of the remaining values be kept constant (a, b, 
…, o, r, s, …). The betterness relation will rank alternative combinations 
(p, q) of the degree to which P and Q are realised, given this fixed choice of 
the degree of realisation of the remaining values. If this ranking is the same 
for all possible fixed choices, the subset of values P and Q are said to be 
separable in the betterness relation. If any arbitrary subset of values is 
separable in this way, the betterness relation is said to be strongly 
separable. 
 
If the betterness relation is strongly separable, it induces a transitive and 
complete betterness relation on each subset of values. In other words, we 
can then evaluate the betterness of each subset of values independently 
from the other values. 
 
                                                     
 
28 In the standard framework, it is assumed that the set of possible lives, L, is a 
product set. This means that the values in a life are independently realisable, i.e. 
that that the domain contains every possible combination of degrees of realisation 
of values. However, this is not a condition which is necessary for the additive 
representation as such. 
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The other necessary condition I shall introduce is the existence of standard 
sequences for each value. A standard sequence defines value differences 
having non-zero, equal spacing in the intended numerical representation of 
the value contribution from each value. Consider again the values P and Q. 
Arbitrarily, define some unit q1 on Q. Now, find some degree p1, such that 
(p1, 0)=(0, q1).29 (Note that this only works if P and Q are both important or 
both unimportant. Hence, I shall assume that there are at least two values 
on each level). Then, find some degree p2, such that (p2, 0) is equivalent 
with (p1, q1). Go on and find some degree p3, such that (p3, 0) is equivalent 
with (p2, q1). Similarly, define p4, p5, … . Now, we have defined a standard 
sequence on value P: 
 
DEFINITION 4: A sequence of degrees pi, pi+1, …, i=1, 2, … , of some 
value P is a standard sequence if and only if there exists q1, q2 on some 
other value Q such that q1 is better than q2 and for all i=1, 2, …,  (pi, q1) is 
equally as good as (pi+1, q2). A standard sequence can be either finite or 
infinite.  
 
A similar procedure can be used on Q. And we can go on adding definitions 
of fractions of the chosen unit.  
 
 
29 To be sure this can be done, we need to assume a solvability condition, cf. 
Krantz et al., op.cit., p. 301. This is another structural condition, which is not 
necessary for the additive representation. 
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The plausibility of these conditions depends of course a lot on whether it is 
possible to describe and individuate values in a way such that the 
contribution of any subset of values, as derived from our basic preferences 
over possible lives, is independent on the degree to which other values are 
realised. I shall not here attempt to argue that these conditions are in fact 
fulfilled. The point is merely to point out that these conditions are 
necessary for the argument Griffin wants to make, and to spell out the 
consequences. 
 
The standard sequence p1, p2, p3, … can be understood as additive self-
concatenation of p1, where p2 is a whole consisting of p1 concatenated with 
an object like itself, and where also q1 is defined as an object like p1. And 
given strong separability and a standard sequence p1, p2, p3, … defined on P 
using q1, q2, q3, …  on Q, it follows straightforwardly from the definition of 
standard sequences that Independence will be fulfilled for this standard 
sequence on P, such that, for all non-negative integers n, n’ and m where 
n≥n’, pn is at least as good as pn’ if and only if pn+m is at least as good as 
pn’+m.30  
 
Suppose now, as Griffin suggests, that A is weakly superior to B in the 
sense that, for any standard sequences a1, a2, a3, … and b1, b2, b3, …,31 
there is some m such that (am, 0) is better than (0, bn), no matter how big n 
 
30 In other words, if a numerical representation was possible (which I have not yet 
assumed), we would have wP(p2)=2wP(p1), wP(p3)=3 wP(p1), …   
31 Note that these standard sequences are not defined relative to each other. 
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is. In the context of additive conjoint measurement, the Archimedean 
condition can be stated thus: every strictly bounded standard sequence is 
finite.32 But as weak superiority is defined here, it violates the Archimedean 
condition, because the standard sequence b1, b2, b3, … is infinite and still 
strictly bounded by (am, 0). Hence, the difference between am and b1 is 
infinitely large and cannot be measured by any real number. This is 
precisely what Griffin needs. 
 
However, we are now in a position where we can apply OBSERVATION 1 
and demonstrate that weak superiority collapses into superiority: if (am, 0) 
is better than (0, bn), no matter how big n is, then it follows from 
OBSERVATION 1 that (a1, 0) is better than (0, bn), no matter how big n is. 
In other words, even the smallest degree to which A can be realised will be 
better than B, no matter the degree to which it is realised. Consequently, 
contrary to his inclination, if Griffin wants to keep the idea that some levels 
of welfare do not add up to others, he is bound to base his argument on 
superiority rather than on weak superiority.  
 
Even so, we might still have a credible view which might avoid the 
Repugnant Conclusion. I shall make some of its implications clear. 
Consider a sequence of lives with decreasing of levels of welfare a, b, c …, 
z. Given that we accept the Utilitarian Total Principle, a concatenation 
procedure is defined (i.e. summing up welfare levels), the betterness 
relation is given and the Independence condition is satisfied. Griffin 
 
32 Cf. Krantz et al., op.cit., p. 253. 
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suggests that some number of people n at some level, say m, is weakly 
superior to the level z. But then it follows from OBSERVATION 1, firstly, 
that m is superior to z; in other words, it would be the case that even one 
person at m outranks any number of lives at z.  
 
Furthermore, we know33 that if we have a decreasing sequence m, n, …, z 
where m is superior to z, then there will be some level in the sequence 
which is superior to its immediate successor. In other words, one person 
living at the lowest level before the discontinuity sets in is superior to any 
number of people living at z. Call this level y. Suppose there is some n such 
that ny is equally good as m. Then the same consequence would follow 
from my OBSERVATION 1: Since y is weakly superior to z (because m 
and therefore also ny is superior to z), it follows that y is superior to z. 
 
Strictly speaking, this view does not avoid the Repugnant Conclusion as I 
have stated it. I shall assume that welfare is measurable on a scale that has 
an extension of the real numbers with infinitesimal numbers.34 I shall not 
go into technical details about infinitesimal numbers.35 It suffices with the 
 
33 From Arrhenius and Rabinowicz’ Observation 2 
34 Alternatively, we could imagine that welfare is measured on two dimensions, cf. 
M. Hausner: Multidimensional Utilities. In R. M. Thrall, C. H. Coombs and R. L. 
Davis (eds.): Decision Processes, John Wiley, 1954, pp. 167-80. 
35 There is a rigorous treatment in A. Robinson: Non-Standard Analysis, Revised 
edition, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1974. As for measurement, see L. Narens: 
"Measurement without Archimedean Axioms”, Philosophy of Science 41 (1974): 
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intuitive understanding that adding an infinitesimal number to another 
infinitesimal number results in an infinitesimal number, and consequently, 
that multiplication of an infinitesimal number with an integer results in 
another infinitesimal number. On this scale, it is still the case that, for any 
positive finite level of welfare, y, however close to zero, a population of m 
people at y is better than n people at a, provided my>na. It is just that below 
such level y, however low, there are lives definitely worse than y but still 
worth living – these are the ones measured by infinitesimal small levels. So 
maybe the level y is not so bad after all.36
 
Whether this is a credible view depends on how the zero on the scale is 
determined,37 and where the discontinuity sets in. Like Parfit, Griffin 
appears to have a zero for the scale of welfare in mind, which is something 
like the level where there is no point of living the life, a life with neither 
positive nor negative value at all; 38 and implicitly, this zero is also the level 
 
374-393, L. Narens: "Minimal Conditions for Additive Conjoint Measurement and 
Qualitative Probability”, Journal of Mathematical Psychology 11 (1974): 404-430 
and H. J. Skala: Non-Archimedean Utility Theory. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1975. 
36 I owe this interpretation to a communication with John Broome. 
37 Cf. John Broome: Weighing Lives, Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 138. This 
point is largely overlooked. 
38 Griffin, op.cit., pp. 130-131, 345 (note 12). 
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where the existence of the person is indifferent from the point of view of 
the Total Principle.39  
 
As regards the discontinuity, we saw above that even the smallest degree to 
which some superior value A can be realised will be better than some 
inferior value B, no matter the degree to which it is realised. This means 
that a life where just one superior value is realised to the smallest possible 
degree is infinitely better that a life where no superior values are realised. 
Interestingly, Griffin seems to accept this consequence, when he says: 40  
 
Then we might wish to stop the slide [...] at that point along the line where 
people’s capacity to appreciate beauty, to form deep loving relationships, to 
accomplish something with their lives beyond just staying alive ... all 
disappear. 
 
Given this more explicit statement, we can now evaluate the repugnant-like 
conclusion: For any positive finite (i.e. non-infinitesimal) level of welfare, 
y, however low, a population of m people at y is better than n people at a, 
provided my>na. It means that a sufficiently large number of persons with 
lives just barely realising one important value in life will represent a greater 
total and therefore be better than some number of persons with a very high 
welfare. This still seems to me a rather repugnant conclusion. 
 
39 Conceptually, however, these are two different questions. Cf. Broome, op.cit, 
Chapter 14. 
40 Griffin, op.cit., p. 340 (note 27), my italics. 
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Another troublesome implication stems from the fact that even one person 
living at a finite level as close to zero as we want is better than any number 
of people living at a positive infinitesimal level. It means that the view 
implies a version of what Parfit calls the Absurd Conclusion: It is better 
that there live no people at all than a number of people with infinitesimal 
low welfare and one person in suffering at any finite negative level. Like 
Parfit, many would find this implication absurd. 
 
 
5. Weak Superiority and the Repugnant Conclusion: The Case of 
Finite Standard Sequences on the Inferior Values 
 
Suppose next that we give up the condition necessary for violating the 
Archimedean Condition, i.e. the existence of infinite standard sequences on 
the inferior values. There is a transitive and complete weak betterness 
relation defined on the domain of possible lives, L={l1, l2, l3, …}, where 
each life is represented by a vector (a, b, c, …) and a, b, c, … are non-
negative numbers describing the degree to which each of the values A, B, 
C, … are realised in this life. Assume that weak betterness at least fulfils 
strong monotonicity such that, for all pairs of lives, if one life has all values 
realised to at least the same degree as another, and at least one value is 
realised to higher degree, then it is better. It might or might not fulfil strong 
separability. In the former case, it might even allow for definition of 
standard sequences; however, any strictly bounded standard sequence is 
finite. 
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If in this framework A is weakly superior to B, it means that there is some a 
such that if A drops below a, no degree of B can ever compensate this loss 
in value (other values kept constant). However, this is compatible with the 
superior and the inferior life being measurable on the same real-valued 
scale, becasue the contribution from the inferior value has a finite upper 
bound. If we were to apply the Utilitarian Total Principle,41 it is clear that n 
people on the superior level always can be outweighed by a sufficiently 
large number m on the inferior level. Hence, in this case, the Repugnant 
Conclusion could not be avoided.  
 
However, even though Griffin’s suggestion appears to be based on the idea 
that values are additive, he is in fact rather sceptical about measuring 
welfare on a cardinal scale.42 Thus, it is possible to understand how weak 
superiority between in prudential values would get transferred to 
interpersonal calculation in another way. Just as the comparison of lives is a 
matter of basic preferences, not of calculations based on other sources, 
comparisons of populations will have to be a matter of basic rankings.43 If 
                                                     
 
41 However, in this case, the framework described so far does not provide a 
cardinal scale that would allow summing up welfare. 
42 Cf. Griffin, op.cit., pp. 88, 98-102. 
43 This is how G. Arrhenius: Future Generations. A Challenge for Moral Theory, 
Uppsala University, 2000 understands Griffin (pp. 97-97).  The interpretation is 
also apparent in R. Crisp: "Utilitarianism and the Life of Virtue”, The 
Philosophical Quarterly 42 (1992): 139-160. 
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this is the case, there is no route to determining the most beneficent 
outcome through simple summation. Then Griffin’s suggestion 
 
Perhaps it is better to have a certain number of people at a certain high level 
than a very much larger number at a level where life is just worth living.  
 
could be interpreted as such a basic ranking where the weak superiority 
does not collapse. 
 
Consider a sequence of lives with decreasing of levels of welfare a, b, c …, 
z. I assume that there is a concatenation procedure, such that we can 
concatenate lives into wholes (that is, populations) and that the domain is 
closed under concatenation. I also assume that a weak betterness relation, 
which is transitive and complete, is defined on the domain. In this 
framework, the ranking can be stated as: There is some level p, which is 
weakly superior to z, without being superior to it. This means that there is 
some number m such that, for all positive integers n, mp is better than nz. 
 
We know from section 1 that the betterness relation on this domain can be 
represented ordinally by a real-valued function, V. And we know from 
OBSERVATION 2 that if p is weakly superior to z without being superior 
to it, then the increasing sequence V(z), V(2z), V(3z), … has an upper 
bound.  
 
Thus, the basic ranking in this context implies that adding more people at z 
has diminishing marginal value that converges to zero. It makes the value 
of a person at z depend on how many other people there are at this level. 
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And this is implausible. I can think of no reason having to do with 
beneficence why one out of two persons at the same level of welfare should 
have more weight than the other. This is my main objection to this view. 
 
Arrhenius states another objection, namely that this view either implies the 
Mere Addition Paradox44 or else it violates what he calls The Inequality 
Aversion Condition: for any triplet of welfare levels a, y, z and for any 
population na, there is some number m, such that the perfectly equal 
population (m+n)y is at least as good as the population combined of na and 
mz. The combined population na and mz is better than the population na. If 
we assume that the view complies with The Inequality Aversion Condition, 
the equal population (n+m)y will be at least as good as the population 
combined of na and mz. By transitivity, the equal population (m+n)y is then 
at least as good as na. But the view is supposed to imply that na is better 
than (m+n)y in the cases where a is weakly superior to y. Hence, the view 
cannot comply with The Inequality Aversion Condition.  
 
The Inequality Aversion Condition is widely assumed to be very 
plausible.45 However, if one share the basic ranking that a certain number 
of people, n, at a certain high level, a, is better than a very much larger 
number (n+m) at a level y where life is just worth living, it might not be 
unreasonable to deny The Inequality Aversion Condition. It should be 
accepted that a population combined of na and mz, where z is slightly 
 
44 Cf. Parfit, op.cit., Chapter 19. 
45 In fact, it is a weak statement of the requirement I mentioned in note 3. 
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worse than y, is better than na alone. But it might be claimed that, in spite 
of the equality obtained by the move from na combined with mz to (n+m)y, 
no number of people gaining slightly more than z can compensate the great 
loss of the n people. Therefore, I am not inclined to attach great weight to 
Arrhenius’ objection. 
 
 
6. A Different Suggestion 
 
Let me briefly mention a suggestion, which I believe Jonathan Glover was 
the first to make:46  
 
But the concession that, other things being equal, there is value in extra happy 
people need not commit us to a simple policy of maximizing happiness. […] It 
is open to us to say that one thing we value is total happiness […] without 
simply adopting the total view. For we may decide that we value people’s lives 
having various qualities (which would put them high on the scale of 'worth-
while life’) and that the absence of these qualities cannot be compensated for 
by any numbers of extra worth-while lives without them. […] 
So we can think that extra people with lives worth living are in themselves a 
good thing, without having to allow that there is always some number of people 
whose existence outweighs any particular impoverishment of life. 
 
Parfit has made a similar suggestion.47
 
46 J. Glover, Jonathan: Causing Death and Saving Lives. Hammondsworth: 
Penguin, 1977, pp. 70-71 
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Consider what I shall call the best things in life. These are the best kinds of 
creative activity and aesthetic experience, the best relationships between 
different people, and the other things which do most to make life worth living 
[...] 
Why is it so hard to believe that my imagined world Z […] would be better than 
a world of ten billion people, all of whom have an extremely high quality of 
life? This is hard to believe because in Z two things are true: people’s lives are 
barely worth living, and most of the good things in life are lost. [...] 
What we might appeal to is […] Perfectionism. [...] We might claim that, even 
if some change brings a great net benefit to those who are affected, it is a 
change for the worse if it involves the loss of one of the best things in life.  
 
The idea seems to be that, apart from the total of welfare, there is a separate 
consideration (Parfit calls it Perfectionism) concerning the various qualities 
in peoples’ lives. And there is a superiority relation between them, such 
that a sufficiently high level of these qualities cannot be compensated by 
the existence of extra people without these qualities, whatever their 
number. 
 
Whereas in the former section the evaluation was based on a basic ranking 
of outcomes, it is here based on two considerations that have to be weighed 
up against each other. Since the total of welfare approaches infinity when 
 
47 Pp. 161-63 in D. Parfit: "Overpopulation and the Quality of Life”, in: P. Singer 
(ed.): Applied Ethics, Oxford University Press, 1986, pp. 145-164. 
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the number of people increases, the level of sufficiently high quality will 
have to be infinitely better than the level just below of insufficiently high 
quality. Such a dramatic discontinuity might not be plausible. 
 
Apart from that, this view will have the same implication as the Lexical 
View which I mentioned in the Introduction: it will put less weight to 
people at low level, and this might be hard to justify. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
I have demonstrated that weak superiority behaves very differently, 
depending on whether value is additive or not. In an additive context, weak 
superiority collapses into superiority, which in this context is a radical 
difference. In a non-additive context, the inferior value has diminishing 
marginal value converging to zero, such that when the value increases, it 
approaches a finite upper bound. In the latter context, weak superiority is 
not a radical difference in value; and even superiority is not a radical 
difference in value if in-between the superior and the inferior object, some 
element is weakly superior to another one. 
 
Often, this difference is overlooked. For instance, Griffin appears on the 
one hand to appeal to the larger plausibility of weak superiority between 
values and at the same to hint at infinite value differences. But it is not 
possible to have both. Also, I have demonstrated that in moving to an 
additive context, rather strong additional assumptions are needed. 
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Finally, I have also demonstrated the consequences of using weak 
superiority to block the Repugnant Conclusion in respectively an additive, 
a non-additive and a mixed context. In the first case (where weak 
superiority collapses), the Repugnant Conclusion is, strictly speaking, not 
avoided. It is just that below any finite level, there are lives definitely 
worse. In the second case, the implication is that adding more people at low 
levels has diminishing marginal value converging to zero. In the third case, 
there is a dramatic discontinuity in the consideration concerning the various 
qualities of peoples’ lives. 
 
None of these implications is plausible. However, since it is hard to come 
up with coherent theories in the field of population ethics, weak superiority 
perhaps retains some interest. 
 
